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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 On November 5, 2010, S.H. and her mother, Carol 
Durrell (“Ms. Durrell”) (collectively, “Appellants”) filed suit 
against Lower Merion School District (“School District”), 
alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
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(“RA”), and § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”).  Appellants contend that the School District 
misdiagnosed S.H. as disabled for several years, and that, as a 
result, it is liable under the IDEA for compensatory education 
and under the RA and ADA for compensatory damages.  The 
District Court dismissed Appellants‟ IDEA claim for failure 
to state a claim.  The District Court then granted summary 
judgment in the School District‟s favor as to the RA and the 
ADA claims.  This appeal followed.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
 S.H., who is African-American, began attending Penn 
Valley Elementary School in the Lower Merion School 
District in kindergarten.  Beginning in first grade (the 2000-
2001 school year), S.H. was placed in Title I classes.
1
  Ms. 
Durrell received a brochure and letters explaining Title I 
services and consented to S.H.‟s enrollment in the program.  
S.H. received Title I services from first grade through fifth 
grade.  
                                                 
1
 Title I is a federally funded remedial program designed to 
improve a student‟s academic performance in reading and 
math.  Title I supplements a student‟s regular school program 
work by providing the student with extra instruction in the 
student‟s regular classroom.  Title I is not intended strictly for 
disabled students, but for any student in need of extra help.   
 
 4 
 
 On October 2, 2001, when S.H. was in second grade, 
Ms. Durrell met with Santa Cucinotta, the school 
psychologist (“Ms. Cucinotta”), the school counselor, and the 
principal.  At this conference, they discussed that S.H. was 
having difficulty with confidence, as well as reading, writing, 
and getting her thoughts on paper.  The team collectively 
agreed that S.H. should continue to receive Title I reading 
services.  After this meeting, Ms. Cucinotta began to monitor 
S.H.‟s progress in her classes.  The School District also 
created a “Child Study Team” to monitor S.H.‟s progress.  
Ms. Durrell participated in many of the Child Study Team 
meetings.   
 When S.H. was in third grade (the 2002-2003 school 
year), Ms. Cucinotta and Ms. Durrell again discussed S.H.‟s 
difficulties in school.  During the spring of that year, S.H. 
scored below the benchmark
2
 on the reading portion of the 
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (“PSSA”).3  On 
May 23, 2003, Ms. Durrell met with the school counselor and 
the principal.  They agreed that, while S.H. was “enthusiastic” 
                                                 
2
 Throughout the record, there are references to S.H.‟s scores 
on standardized tests as compared to benchmark scores.  
However, aside from the absolute numerical value, we have 
been provided no information with which to contextualize 
these scores.  Without additional insight as to their meaning, 
we can ascribe only limited weight to these scores as part of 
our analysis. 
3
 S.H. scored 1217 when the benchmark score for a student 
her age was 1321. 
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and “had a nice grade 3 experience,” the team needed to 
develop strategies directed toward improving S.H.‟s attention 
and focus.  (App. 464.) 
 At the beginning of S.H.‟s fourth-grade year (the 
2003-2004 school year), S.H. scored below the benchmark 
score on the Degrees of Readings Powers (“DRP”) test.4  On 
February 24, 2004, the Child Study Team, consisting of Ms. 
Durrell, Ms. Cucinotta, the school counselor, and S.H.‟s 
fourth-grade teacher, met to discuss S.H.‟s progress.  They 
talked about S.H.‟s enthusiasm for certain activities, but noted 
her unwillingness to continue participating in Title I reading 
classes, and her difficulties with “place value” in math, and 
“decoding” and “understanding the main idea” in reading.  
(App. 465.)  The team decided to send a referral packet to 
pupil services for S.H. and issued a Permission to Evaluate 
(“PTE”), which is a request to the parent that the student be 
evaluated in order to determine eligibility and need for special 
education services.  Ms. Durrell consented to the evaluation.  
That year, S.H.‟s fourth-grade teacher also explained to Ms. 
Durrell that S.H. was “struggling” in her studies.  On June 6, 
2004, the School District issued another PTE for S.H., and on 
June 8, Ms. Durrell again consented.   
 Ms. Cucinotta began the evaluation in June 2004, 
using the predicted achievement model to assess S.H.
5
  The 
                                                 
4
 S.H. scored 38 when the benchmark score for a student her 
age was 42-48. 
5
 The predicted achievement model is an accepted model 
within the School District for evaluating students.  Under this 
model, a computer program generates an expected 
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results revealed a 16-point discrepancy between S.H.‟s 
expected score of 106 and her Reading Comprehension score 
of 90.
6
  As part of the evaluation, Ms. Cucinotta considered 
whether any mitigating factors would have affected S.H.‟s 
achievements, such as S.H.‟s personal or familial 
circumstances.
7
  Ms. Cucinotta also spoke with Ms. Durrell, 
reviewed a literacy specialist‟s evaluations of S.H. from the 
end of third grade and the beginning of fourth grade, and 
considered S.H.‟s below-benchmark PSSA and DRP scores.  
Ms. Cucinotta considered the testing scores, as well as her 
own “clinical observations of [S.H.‟s] language processing, 
the difficulty [S.H.] had with directions, [and] the vocabulary 
that [S.H.] didn‟t understand.”  (App. 381.)   
 Ms. Cucinotta concluded her evaluation at the 
beginning of S.H.‟s fifth-grade year (the 2004-2005 school 
year), and published the results in two evaluation reports, 
dated September 2 and 13, 2004.  As a result of the 
evaluation, Ms. Cucinotta determined that S.H. had a learning 
                                                                                                             
achievement score based on the student‟s IQ, which is then 
compared to the student‟s actual score. 
6
 Joanna Wexler, a psychologist for the School District, 
testified in her deposition that a 15-point discrepancy between 
the expected achievement score and the actual achievement 
score is considered an indication of a learning disability.   
7
 In January of 2002, tragedy struck S.H.‟s family when a 
murder-suicide took the lives of five of S.H.‟s relatives, 
including a 14-year-old cousin with whom S.H. was very 
close.  S.H. took these deaths particularly hard and had 
difficulty coping with them. 
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disability in reading and math and recommended that she 
receive specially designed instruction in these areas.  The 
reports also noted that S.H. was unhappy that she was 
designated as disabled and had told Ms. Cucinotta that she did 
not think she belonged in special education.  Ms. Durrell 
reviewed and signed the evaluation reports, indicating that 
she agreed with the recommendations.   
 Following her designation as disabled, a team was 
assembled to develop an Individualized Education Program 
(“IEP”) for S.H.  The record indicates that the IEP team 
considered S.H.‟s personal sentiment that she did not want to 
be in special education, and that Ms. Cucinotta and a 
guidance counselor subsequently discussed S.H.‟s feelings 
with her.  On October 1, 2004, Ms. Durrell attended an IEP 
meeting for S.H., during which Ms. Durrell received and 
approved the Notice of Recommended Placement 
(“NOREP”).  The NOREP indicated that S.H. would receive 
special education services during her fifth-grade year — 
specifically, learning support in the resource room as well as 
itinerant speech and language therapy.   
 On November 14, 2004, the IEP team met again to 
create a revised IEP for S.H., which Ms. Durrell approved.  A 
revised NOREP was subsequently issued, indicating that S.H. 
would continue to receive speech and language therapy, and 
would also be placed in a part-time learning support class 
called Instructional Support Lab (“ISL”).   
 On January 25, 2005, when S.H. was in fifth grade and 
less than three months after she was placed in special 
education, S.H. scored above-grade level on the Woodcock 
Reading Mastery Test.  She scored at a 5.3 grade level in 
 8 
 
word identification, 6.4 grade level in word attack, and 6.7 
grade level in word comprehension.   
 From sixth to eighth grade, S.H. attended Welsh 
Valley Middle School in the School District.  S.H.‟s IEP team 
selected her classes, with her mother‟s approval.  When S.H. 
was in sixth grade, the IEP team developed a new IEP 
providing S.H. with accommodations for standardized testing.  
Ms. Durrell agreed to these accommodations.  
 On October 5, 2006, Ms. Durrell emailed S.H.‟s 
seventh-grade ISL teacher and stated, “I am really concerned 
about [S.H.‟s PSSA] score.  She is below proficiency.  Could 
we consider having her work with the Reading Specialist . . . 
she needs some one-to-one instruction to bring her up to 
proficiency.  This is a real concern for me now. . . it is 
obvious that more needs to be done.”  (App. 223-24, 573.)  In 
response to this email, the School District provided S.H. with 
one-on-one instruction with a reading specialist.  S.H. again 
confided in her seventh-grade teacher that she was unhappy 
with ISL and didn‟t feel like she needed the extra help.   
 On May 23, 2007, when S.H. was in seventh grade, the 
School District issued an evaluation report analyzing S.H.‟s 
academic progress.  The report indicated that S.H. was 
receiving good grades in her classes and had made positive 
progress toward her IEP goals.  The report recommended 
S.H. be removed from special education services for language 
arts due to her progress in that area, but that she continue to 
receive specialized instruction in reading and writing.   
Following the 2007 evaluation, these recommendations were 
implemented.  Because S.H. continued to receive special 
education, there was not time in her schedule for her to take 
eighth-grade science and Spanish.   
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 S.H. began attending Lower Merion High School when 
she was in ninth grade (the 2008-2009 school year).  The 
School District created a suggested schedule of classes for 
S.H.‟s ninth-grade year, which included ISL, and sent the 
schedule home to Ms. Durrell.  All parents of rising ninth-
graders had the option of requesting a change in their child‟s 
suggested course schedule.  Ms. Durrell had this option of 
picking different courses for S.H., but elected not to do so.  
That fall, S.H. scored just below the benchmark on the 
Advanced Degrees of Reading Power Test.
8
   
 On April 21, 2009, the School District issued a second 
PTE for S.H. to determine if she still needed special 
education; Ms. Durrell consented to the evaluation.  Dr. Craig 
Cosden (“Dr. Cosden”), a School District psychologist, 
performed the evaluation.  As part of the evaluation, Dr. 
Cosden spoke with both S.H. and Ms. Durrell, obtained 
reports from S.H.‟s teachers, discussed S.H.‟s progress with 
both the Literacy Specialist and the Math Specialist, and 
reviewed S.H.‟s grades and scores on standardized tests.  Dr. 
Cosden determined that S.H. had average intelligence, but 
consistently demonstrated achievement levels below her 
intelligence level in the areas of reading and math.  The 
evaluation report also indicated that S.H. had a specific 
learning disability, although the disability was not identified.  
                                                 
8
 S.H. scored 49 when the benchmark score for a student her 
age was 50-70. 
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Dr. Cosden thus concluded that S.H. was still in need of 
special education in reading and math.
9
   
 S.H. continued to have ISL classes in tenth grade.  On 
November 2, 2009, Ms. Durrell requested that the School 
District remove S.H. from ISL and place her in study hall.  
The School District changed S.H.‟s schedule in accordance 
with this request within two days.   
 The School District complied with Ms. Durrell‟s other 
requests as well.  For example, on November 13, 2009, Ms. 
Durrell emailed Dr. Kimberly Fedchak (“Dr. Fedchak”), a 
school employee, to ask if Dr. Fedchak could meet with S.H. 
one-on-one for additional instruction.  Ms. Durrell wrote, “I 
would like to know if [S.H.] can come in to work with you 
one-on-one, during academic recovery to go over her test 
corrections.  She said she didn‟t have a clear understanding of 
the material.  She does have math goals in her IEP.  I feel the 
more individual instruction she has, the better she‟ll do.”  
(App. 237, 704.)  Dr. Fedchak agreed.  
 Also in November of 2009, Dr. Cosden met with Ms. 
Durrell and Ms. Durrell‟s legal counsel, as part of an IEP 
meeting.  During this meeting, Ms. Durrell‟s counsel 
requested a copy of the testing protocols relating to Dr. 
Cosden‟s evaluation of S.H.  Dr. Cosden lied to Ms. Durrell 
and told her that the testing protocols had been destroyed.  Dr. 
Cosden later admitted that he had “intentionally misled the 
                                                 
9
 In June 2006, S.H.‟s close friend was killed in a car 
accident, and S.H. struggled to cope with this death.  Dr. 
Cosden‟s report makes no mention of either this event or the 
2002 murder-suicide. 
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family” because he did not think it was “ethical” for him to 
disclose the protocols to “persons who have no ability to be 
able to process and understand the information.”  (App. 963.)   
 On November 23, 2009, Ms. Durrell filed a Due 
Process Complaint Notice, requesting a special education 
hearing and seeking an Independent Education Evaluation 
(“IEE”).  The School District consented to the IEE, and Ms. 
Durrell selected Dr. Umar Abdullah-Johnson (“Dr. Abdullah-
Johnson”), a nationally certified school psychologist, to 
perform the evaluation.  The IEE was performed in January 
2010, and Dr. Abdullah-Johnson published his report on 
February 24, 2010.  His intelligence tests revealed S.H.‟s IQ 
to be 100, which is in the middle of the average range.  The 
achievement test placed S.H. in the “average” range in four 
out of six composite score areas, in the “below average” 
range for Reading Comprehension & Fluency, and in the 
“superior” range for Basic Reading.   
 Dr. Abdullah-Johnson also determined that any 
discrepancy between S.H.‟s IQ and her achievement scores 
was too small to constitute a severe discrepancy, and that the 
data used in the 2004 report prepared by Ms. Cucinotta did 
not support the School District‟s conclusion that S.H. had a 
learning disability.  He concluded that S.H.‟s designation as 
learning disabled was, and always had been, erroneous.
10
   
                                                 
10
 Additionally, in connection with this lawsuit, two 
additional experts, Dr. Tawanna Jones, a certified school 
psychologist, and Dr. Ronald Rosenberg, a licensed 
psychologist, also reviewed various documents, including 
previous evaluations of S.H. and her test scores, and agreed 
with Dr. Abdullah-Johnson that S.H. was not disabled.   
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 Following Dr. Abdullah-Johnson‟s evaluation, Ms. 
Durrell requested that S.H. be removed from special 
education.  Dr. Cosden also prepared a Reevaluation Report.  
The report discussed S.H.‟s academic history and included 
observations from S.H.‟s then-current teachers.  Dr. Cosden‟s 
report also discussed the test results from Dr. Abdullah-
Johnson‟s evaluation of S.H., although it did not specifically 
reference Dr. Abdullah-Johnson‟s determination that S.H. 
was not, and never had been, disabled.  The report did, 
however, state that S.H. did not have a disability and 
therefore was no longer eligible to receive special education.  
On April 12, 2010, the School District issued a NOREP 
indicating that S.H. did not have a specific learning disability 
and removing her from special education.  S.H. received no 
special education in her junior and senior years of high 
school. 
 As of February 14, 2012, S.H. had been accepted to 
West Virginia University, Kutztown University, Cabrini 
College, and Neumann University. 
B. Procedural History 
 Following S.H.‟s removal from special education, the 
School District moved to dismiss Ms. Durrell‟s complaint 
before the Hearing Officer as moot, because S.H. was not a 
child with a disability and therefore was no longer entitled to 
the IDEA‟s protection.11  The Hearing Officer agreed and 
determined that he did not have jurisdiction over S.H.‟s claim 
                                                 
11
 For purposes of that motion, as well as for this appeal, the 
School District concedes that S.H. does not have, and has 
never had, a learning disability. 
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because she admitted that she is not disabled and never has 
been disabled.   
 On November 5, 2010, Appellants filed suit in federal 
district court, alleging three claims.  Claim One asserted that, 
under the IDEA, the School District violated its duty to 
accurately identify children with disabilities and to ensure 
that S.H. was properly evaluated and assessed as not disabled.  
Claim Two alleged a violation of § 504 of the RA, and Claim 
Three alleged a violation of § 202 of the ADA.  Claims Two 
and Three alleged that the School District discriminated 
against S.H. by erroneously identifying her as a child with a 
disability.   
 Appellants sought compensatory education and 
monetary damages.  According to Appellants, S.H.‟s receipt 
of special education services damaged her self-confidence 
and academic progress.  It also prevented her from 
participating in certain regular-curriculum classes, including 
science and one year of foreign language during middle 
school, and higher-level courses in high school.  Appellants‟ 
expert calculated S.H.‟s damages as $127,010, which includes 
two additional years of college tuition, 50 hours of 
psychotherapy, and 600 hours of tutoring. 
 On June 30, 2011, the District Court granted the 
School District‟s motion to dismiss Claim One.12  The 
                                                 
12
 The School District also moved to dismiss Claims Two and 
Three, which the District Court denied.  The RA and the 
ADA create causes of action for individuals who are 
“regarded as” disabled.  29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(C).  The denial of the motion to dismiss Claims 
Two and Three is not before us on appeal. 
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District Court concluded that, because S.H. asserts that she is 
not disabled, she cannot be, for pleading purposes, “a „child 
with a disability‟ and thus cannot seek relief under the 
IDEA.”  Durrell ex rel. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 
10-6070, 2011 WL 2582147, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2011).
13
   
 On July 19, 2012, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in the School District‟s favor as to the remaining 
RA and ADA claims.  The District Court first ruled that, in 
order to sustain a claim seeking compensatory damages under 
the RA and ADA, a plaintiff must be able to show evidence 
of intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.  
Durrell ex rel. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-6070, 
2012 WL 2953956, at *5-7 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2012).  The 
District Court then concluded that Appellants had produced 
no evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact as to 
intentional discrimination and granted summary judgment.  
Id. at *8 (“While we find any misidentification of S.H. 
unfortunate, plaintiffs have not come forward with any 
evidence which would allow a reasonable jury to find that the 
School District intentionally discriminated against S.H. when 
it regarded her as disabled.”).   
 Appellants filed a timely appeal. 
                                                 
13
 The School District also sought to dismiss Claim One 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Recognizing that, unless Congress specifically 
defines a limitation in a statute as jurisdictional, courts 
“„should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character,‟” the District Court dismissed Claim One under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  S.H., 2011 WL 2582147, at *3 (quoting 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006)). 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s 
decision to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  Fleisher 
v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  In 
reviewing a dismissal, we “accept all well-pled allegations in 
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 
464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).  To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations that, when taken as true, “state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be 
granted when it appears to a certainty that no relief can be 
granted under any set of facts which could be proved.”  
Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 
F.3d 340, 350 (3d  Cir. 2012). 
 We review a district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district 
court.  Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 
254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012).  A grant of summary judgment is 
appropriate where the moving party has established “that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A fact is material if it might affect the outcome 
of the suit under the governing law.  Scheidemantle v. 
Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 
538 (3d Cir. 2006).  The reviewing court should view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 
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draw all reasonable inferences in that party‟s favor.  Id.  
However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, “the 
non-moving party must present more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence; „there must be evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the [non-movant].‟”  Jakimas v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. IDEA Claim 
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred when it 
dismissed their IDEA claim.  Appellants contend that the 
IDEA‟s jurisdictional umbrella encompasses not merely 
children with disabilities, but also children who have been 
misidentified as disabled.  This question is a matter of first 
impression for this Court, as it requires us to determine 
whether the protections and remedies of the IDEA extend 
beyond children with disabilities.  While Appellants‟ 
arguments are emotionally compelling, they are ultimately to 
no avail.  
1. Plain Language of the Statute 
 This question presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation.  “Our goal when interpreting a statute is to 
effectuate Congress‟s intent.  Because we presume that 
Congress‟s intent is most clearly expressed in the text of the 
statute, we begin our analysis with an examination of the 
plain language of the relevant provision.”  Hagans v. Comm’r 
of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jimenez v. 
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Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As with any 
question of statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with 
the plain language of the statute.”).  “When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then this first canon [of statutory 
interpretation] is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”  
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).  
Moreover, “where the statutory language is unambiguous, the 
court should not consider statutory purpose or legislative 
history,” In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 
(3d Cir. 2010), because we operate under the “assumption 
that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose,” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).   
 With this framework in mind, we turn to the language 
of the IDEA.  The IDEA guarantees “procedural safeguards 
with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public 
education” to “children with disabilities and their parents.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (emphasis added).  Children with 
disabilities (and their parents) who claim violations of the 
IDEA can file a complaint with a due process hearing officer.  
Id. § 1415(b)(6).  The complaint may pertain to “any matter 
relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child.”  Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A) 
(emphasis added).  Following the due process hearing, the 
IDEA permits an aggrieved party to bring a civil action in any 
court.  Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).  Thus, a child may file a civil suit 
only if he or she would have been entitled to file a complaint 
before a hearing officer; it is clear from the plain language 
that only “children with disabilities and their parents” may do 
so.   
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 The IDEA defines “child with a disability” to mean 
a child with intellectual disabilities, hearing 
impairments (including deafness), speech or 
language impairments, visual impairments 
(including blindness), serious emotional 
disturbance (or referred to in this chapter as 
“emotional disturbance”), orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, 
other health impairments, or specific learning 
disabilities; and who by reason thereof needs 
special education and related services. 
Id. § 1401(3)(A).  There is no indication that the term “child 
with a disability” includes children who are mistakenly 
identified as disabled, but who are, in fact, not disabled.
14
  
Therefore, under the Act‟s plain language, it is clear that the 
IDEA creates a cause of action only for individuals with 
disabilities.  Because Appellants assert that S.H. is not, and 
never was, a child with a disability, S.H. is excluded from the 
IDEA‟s provisions and may not bring a claim under that Act.  
(See Appellants Reply Br. 1 (“[The] School District . . . 
cannot avoid reality that S.H. is not a child with a disability 
and never was.”).)  We cannot, sua sponte, create a cause of 
action where the plain language of a statute does not provide 
for one.
15
 
                                                 
14
 There is no “regarded as” language in the IDEA, which 
distinguishes it from the RA and the ADA, as discussed 
below. 
15
 Appellants also rely on our decision in Ferren C. v. School 
District of Philadelphia, 612 F.3d 712, 719 (3d Cir. 2010), in 
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2. Legislative History 
 Appellants argue that the plain language is not 
dispositive.  They claim that they can maintain a cause of 
action under the IDEA because, even though S.H. is not 
disabled, she is African-American and the IDEA should be 
construed to protect minority children who are misidentified 
as disabled.  In making this argument, Appellants ask us 
“simply to acknowledge the flip side of the „identification‟ 
coin; that after a school district has, through the IDEA‟s 
procedures, misidentified an African-American child as 
having a disability, the child enjoys the same protections of 
the IDEA hearing process.”  (Appellants Br. 17.)  In support 
of this proposition, Appellants point to language in the 
“Findings” section of the IDEA and to a House committee 
report prepared in anticipation of the IDEA‟s introduction, 
both of which acknowledge the problem of minority students 
being misidentified as disabled.
16
  Appellants contend that 
                                                                                                             
which we held that a disabled young woman, who was 24 
years old and not a “child,” was still entitled to bring a claim 
under the IDEA.  Appellants reason that since we allowed this 
young woman, who is not a “child,” to bring a claim, we 
should allow S.H., who is not “disabled,” to bring a claim.  
(Appellants Reply Br. 11.)  This argument stretches our 
holding in Ferren C. beyond credulity.  We permitted the 
claim in Ferren C. because the harm to the young woman had 
occurred while she was a “child with a disability.”  S.H. has 
never been a “child with a disability.” 
16
 The “Findings” section of the IDEA states: 
Greater efforts are needed to prevent the 
intensification of problems connected with 
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mislabeling and high dropout rates among 
minority children with disabilities.  More 
minority children continue to be served in 
special education than would be expected from 
the percentage of minority students in the 
general school population.  African-American 
children are identified as having intellectual 
disabilities and emotional disturbance at rates 
greater than their White counterparts.   
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(A).  Similarly, the relevant portion 
of the House committee report, issued by the House 
Committee on Education during its hearings on the IDEA, 
states: 
For minority students, misclassification or 
inappropriate placement in special education 
programs can have significant adverse 
consequences, particularly when these students 
are being removed from regular education 
settings and denied access to the core 
curriculum. Of particular concern is that, often, 
the more separate a program is from the general 
education setting, the more limited the 
curriculum and the greater the consequences to 
the student, particularly in terms of access to 
postsecondary education and employment 
opportunities. . . . Research shows that African 
Americans are nearly three times as likely to be 
identified as mentally retarded as their peers 
and nearly twice as likely to be labeled 
emotionally disturbed.  
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“Congress would have not expressed such concern about the 
misidentification of African-American children as disabled 
and then left those same children without any recourse under 
the IDEA.”  (Appellants Br. 19.)   
 Appellants‟ reliance on the statutory Findings and 
House committee report is unavailing.  Legislative history has 
never been permitted to override the plain meaning of a 
statute.  As the Supreme Court has made clear, “Congress‟ 
„authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the 
legislative history.‟”  Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 
S. Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)).  
Legislative history may not be used to alter the plain meaning 
of a statute.  “The law is what Congress enacts, not what its 
members say on the floor.”  Szehinskyj v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 
253, 256 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Moreover, “legislative history may be referenced only 
if the statutory language is written without a plain meaning, 
i.e., if the statutory language is ambiguous.”  Byrd v. 
Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 2013).  “Legislative 
history . . . is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”  
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 (2011); see 
also Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“There is no need to resort to legislative history unless the 
statutory language is ambiguous.”).  We must “not take the 
opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to 
muddy clear statutory language.”  Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1266; 
see also Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & 
                                                                                                             
H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 98-99 (2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
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Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (“This 
plain meaning cannot be circumvented unless we have the 
rare instance when there is a clearly expressed congressional 
intent to the contrary or when a literal application of the plain 
language would frustrate the statute‟s purpose or lead to an 
absurd result.”).  Because there is no ambiguity in the IDEA‟s 
creation of a cause of action, we need not even look to 
legislative history.
17
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 In any case, contrary to Appellants‟ assertions, the 
legislative history does not evidence Congress‟s desire to 
create a cause of action for students who are misidentified as 
disabled.  As the House committee report makes clear, 
Congress sought to remedy the problem of over-identification 
through the implementation of preventative and remedial 
policies and practices at the local level.  See H.R. Rep. No. 
108-77, at 98-99.  Indeed, Congress enacted several 
provisions within the IDEA aimed at addressing this problem.  
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24) (conditioning receipt of 
federal funds on the state‟s effectuation of “policies and 
procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate over[-
]identification or disproportionate representation by race and 
ethnicity of children as children with disabilities”); Id. § 
1416(a)(3)(C) (stating that the Secretary of Education has 
overall responsibility to oversee the states‟ obligations and 
responses as to “[d]isproportionate representation of racial 
and ethnic groups in special education” as a result of 
inappropriate identification). 
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3. Child Find Provision 
 Appellants also argue that IDEA‟s “Child Find” 
requirement permits this lawsuit.  IDEA‟s “Child Find” 
provision states: 
All children with disabilities residing in the 
State, including children with disabilities who 
are homeless children or are wards of the State 
and children with disabilities attending private 
schools, regardless of the severity of their 
disabilities, and who are in need of special 
education and related services, are identified, 
located, and evaluated and a practical method is 
developed and implemented to determine which 
children with disabilities are currently receiving 
needed special education and related services. 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).  Appellants argue that, because 
the duty to identify children with disabilities falls squarely on 
schools, any parent should be able to bring a complaint to 
enforce this provision as this is clearly a “matter relating to 
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education 
to such child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). 
 Once again, Appellants‟ argument has no foothold in 
the plain language of the statute.  The Child Find provision, 
by its own language, imposes a duty on the school to create 
procedures by which to identify children with disabilities.  
However, the obligation of this duty is still only to “children 
with disabilities.”  Appellants cannot escape the plain 
language of the IDEA.  Moreover, under the evidence 
presented, it is clear that the School District satisfied its duty 
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under the Child Find provision; the School District evaluated 
S.H. on numerous occasions in accordance with its internal 
policies, and S.H. was found to be eligible for special 
education. 
 Because the plain language of the statute only permits 
a child with a disability to bring a claim under the IDEA, 
S.H., who by her own admission is not disabled, cannot 
sustain her action. 
B. Intentional Discrimination Under the RA 
and ADA 
 
 Appellants also brought claims under § 504 of the RA 
and § 202 of the ADA.  Section 504 of the RA provides: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States, as defined in 
section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Section 202 of the ADA similarly states:  
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity. 
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42 U.S.C. § 12132.  Both the RA and ADA extend their 
protections not only to individuals who actually are disabled, 
but also to individuals who are “regarded as” having a 
disability.  See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(C).  There is no dispute that S.H. was “regarded as” 
disabled by the School District, and therefore S.H. is not 
barred from bringing these claims. 
 The same standards govern both the RA and the ADA 
claims.  Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. 
Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009).  To prevail on 
these claims, Appellants must demonstrate that S.H.: “(1) has 
a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to participate in a 
school program; and (3) was denied the benefits of the 
program or was otherwise subject to discrimination because 
of her disability.”  Id.  The District Court concluded that, 
because Appellants seek compensatory damages, they are 
required to make a showing of intentional discrimination to 
prevail on their claims.  Appellants argue that no such 
showing is required.  We have not yet spoken on this issue. 
1. Statutory Language 
 Section 203 of the ADA states that the remedies 
available under § 202 of the ADA are the same remedies 
available under § 505 of the RA.
18
  Similarly, § 505 of the RA 
clearly states that the remedies available under § 504 of the 
                                                 
18
 “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 
505(a)(2) of the RA] shall be the remedies, procedures, and 
rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [§ 202 
of the ADA].”  42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
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RA shall be the same remedies available under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
19
  Based on this statutory language, 
the Supreme Court has observed that, “the remedies for 
violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies 
available in a private cause of action under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”20  Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 
181, 185 (2002).  Plainly, therefore, Supreme Court precedent 
construing Title VI governs enforcement of the RA and the 
ADA as well.  See Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 
384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The ADA was modeled on the 
Rehabilitation Act, which had been modeled after Title VI, so 
it follows rationally that the rights and remedies afforded 
under both statutes should be governed by Title VI 
precedent.”)  Thus, we must look to what Title VI, and the 
cases construing it, require for compensatory damages to 
determine the appropriate standard here. 
                                                 
19
 “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . shall be available to any 
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient 
of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance 
under [§ 504 of the RA].”  29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). 
20
 That Congress intended to create identical remedies under 
Title VI, the RA, and ADA is hardly surprising given how 
closely the language of both the ADA and RA track Title VI.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, with 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 
U.S.C. § 12132. 
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 In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission 
of New York, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that 
private individuals who brought suit under Title VI could not 
recover compensatory relief in the absence of a showing of 
intentional discrimination.  463 U.S. 582, 597, 607 (1983); 
see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83 (2001) 
(restating Guardian‟s holding that “private individuals [can] 
not recover compensatory damages under Title VI except for 
intentional discrimination”).  We therefore take the next 
logical step and hold that claims for compensatory damages 
under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA also require a 
finding of intentional discrimination.   
 Appellants urge that our previous holding in 
Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 
238 (3d Cir. 1999), suggests a different outcome.  In 
Ridgewood, parents of a disabled child brought claims against 
Ridgewood Board of Education, alleging that Ridgewood‟s 
failure to provide their son, M.E., with a free appropriate 
public education (“FAPE”) constituted a violation of the 
IDEA, § 504 of the RA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New Jersey 
state law, and seeking compensatory damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 245.  The District Court first found that 
Ridgewood had provided M.E. with a FAPE under the IDEA.  
The District Court then granted summary judgment in 
Ridgewood‟s favor as to M.E.‟s claim under § 504 of the RA.  
Id. at 246.  Specifically, the District Court concluded that 
M.E.‟s § 504 claim failed because M.E. had not demonstrated 
that he was “excluded from participation in, denied the 
benefits of, or subject to the discrimination at, the school.”  
Id.  On appeal, we reversed, finding that the evidence showed 
that Ridgewood had not provided M.E. with a FAPE.  We 
also concluded that summary judgment on the § 504 claim 
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had been improperly granted.  We stated that while “a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants know or should be 
reasonably expected to know of his disability,” to establish a 
§ 504 violation, “a plaintiff need not prove that defendants’ 
discrimination was intentional.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Ridgewood does not alter our analysis.  Our statement 
in Ridgewood, that “a plaintiff need not prove that 
defendants‟ discrimination was intentional,” referred only to 
liability, and not damages; it was intended to address the 
requirements for showing a violation of § 504, not the 
requirements for particular remedies.  Our statement, thus, is 
inconsequential to whether a plaintiff seeking compensatory 
damages must allege intentional discrimination.
21
   
 We also note that our holding here is in line with our 
sister Circuits applying Guardian‟s principles in the RA and 
the ADA context.  All courts of appeals that have considered 
this issue have held that compensatory damages are not 
available under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA absent 
intentional discrimination.  See Meagley, 639 F.3d at 389 
(“All circuits to decide the question have held that to recover 
compensatory damages under either the ADA or the 
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must establish that the agency‟s 
discrimination was intentional. . . . And they have all done so 
for good reason.”); T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of 
Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 603-04 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d 
                                                 
21
 Even if we were to accept Appellants‟ view of our holding 
in Ridgewood, we would be forced to question its vitality 
following the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence in Barnes, 536 
U.S. 181, and Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275. 
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Cir. 2009); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 
2008); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 
(1st Cir. 2003) (“[P]rivate individuals may recover 
compensatory damages under § 504 . . . only for intentional 
discrimination.”); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 
567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff asserting a private 
cause of action for violations of the ADA or the RA may only 
recover compensatory damages upon a showing of intentional 
discrimination.”); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 
1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim for 
compensatory damages under the RA “requires proof the 
defendant has intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff”); Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 
n.9 (4th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that recovery of damages 
under the RA requires a finding of intentional 
discrimination); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 
v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2007) (same).
22
   
2. Standard for Intentional Discrimination 
 There have been two alternative standards suggested 
for intentional discrimination: discriminatory animus and 
deliberate indifference.  Five of our sister courts have 
                                                 
22
 Appellants also argue that this Court should not require 
intentional discrimination because this Court has consistently 
rejected such standards in the IDEA compensatory remedy 
cases.  See M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 
389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P. 
ex rel. Bess. P., 62 F.3d 520, 537 (3d  Cir. 1995).  This 
argument is inapposite as compensatory and punitive 
damages are not available under the IDEA.  See Chambers, 
587 F.3d at 185-86. 
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explicitly rejected discriminatory animus and held that 
deliberate indifference satisfies the requisite showing of 
intentional discrimination.  See Liese v. Indian River Cnty. 
Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 348 (11th Cir. 2012); Meagley, 
639 F.3d at 389; Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 275; Mark H., 513 F.3d 
at 938; Powers, 184 F.3d at 1153.  These courts have 
generally applied a two-part standard for deliberate 
indifference, requiring both (1) “knowledge that a harm to a 
federally protected right is substantially likely,” and (2) “a 
failure to act upon that likelihood.”  Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 
260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Loeffler, 582 
F.3d at 275 (holding that “intentional discrimination may be 
inferred when a policymaker acted with at least deliberate 
indifference to the strong likelihood that a violation of 
federally protected rights will result from the implementation 
of the challenged policy or custom” (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted)); Liese, 701 F.3d at 344 (holding that 
under the more lenient standard of deliberate indifference, a 
plaintiff must prove that “„the defendant knew that harm to a 
federally protected right was substantially likely and [that the 
defendant] failed to act on that likelihood‟” (quoting T.W., 
610 F.3d at 604)).  Deliberate indifference “„does not require 
a showing of personal ill will or animosity toward the 
disabled person.‟”  Meagley, 639 F.3d at 389 (quoting Barber 
v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 
2009)); see also Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 275.  However, 
“deliberate indifference must be a „deliberate choice, rather 
than negligence or bureaucratic inaction.‟”  Loeffler, 582 F.3d 
at 276 (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 193 (2d 
Cir. 2007).
23
 
                                                 
23
 This definition of deliberate indifference in the RA and the 
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 Two courts of appeals have suggested that plaintiffs 
seeking compensatory damages must demonstrate a higher 
showing of intentional discrimination than deliberate 
indifference, such as discriminatory animus.  See Nieves-
Marquez, 353 F.3d at 126-27 (suggesting that discriminatory 
animus is the level of intent required) (citing Schultz v. Young 
Men’s Christian Ass’n of U.S., 139 F.3d 286, 290-91 (1st Cir. 
1999)); Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 575 (rejecting a deliberate 
indifference standard and adopting a higher showing for 
intentional discrimination) (citing Carter v. Orleans Parish 
Pub. Schs., 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984)).  To succeed 
under a discriminatory animus standard, a plaintiff must show 
“prejudice, spite or ill will.”  Liese, 701 F.3d at 344.   
 Which standard to apply — discriminatory animus or 
deliberate indifference — is a matter of first impression for 
our Court.  We now follow in the footsteps of a majority of 
                                                                                                             
ADA context is consistent with our standard of deliberate 
indifference in the context of § 1983 suits by prison inmates.  
See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that, in a § 1983 claim, deliberate 
indifference requires proof that the prison “„knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety‟” 
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  The 
definition is also consistent with the Supreme Court‟s 
definition of deliberate indifference in the context of sexual 
harassment claims under Title IX.  See Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (requiring “actual 
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient‟s programs and 
fail[ure] [to] adequately . . . respond”). 
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our sister courts and hold that a showing of deliberate 
indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages 
under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA.  However, as 
the Eleventh Circuit recently noted, despite the adoption of 
the deliberate indifference standard by many of our sister 
courts, “there has been little explication for the conclusion 
that intentional discrimination under the RA may be 
established by deliberate indifference.”  Liese, 701 F.3d at 
345.  We offer our explanation here and adopt many of the 
same reasons provided by the Eleventh Circuit.   
 As an initial matter, the deliberate indifference 
standard is better suited to the remedial goals of the RA and 
the ADA than is the discriminatory animus alternative.  In 
discussing the enactment of the RA and the ADA, the 
Supreme Court observed that “[d]iscrimination against the 
handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the 
product, not of invidious animus, but rather of 
thoughtlessness and indifference — of benign neglect.”  
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985); see also 
Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944-45 
(9th Cir. 2011) (applying Choate‟s discussion of the 
enactment of the RA to the ADA).  Moreover, “[f]ederal 
agencies and commentators on the plight of the handicapped 
similarly have found that discrimination against the 
handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes 
rather than affirmative animus.”  Alexander, 469 U.S. at 296.  
Consistent with these motivations, the RA and the ADA are 
targeted to address “more subtle forms of discrimination” 
than merely “obviously exclusionary conduct.”  Chapman, 
631 F.3d at 945.  Thus, a standard of deliberate indifference, 
rather than one that targets animus, will give meaning to the 
RA‟s and the ADA‟s purpose to end systematic neglect.  See 
 33 
 
Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 (noting that Senator Humphrey, who 
introduced the measure, stated that “we can no longer tolerate 
the invisibility of the handicapped in America” (quoting 118 
Cong. Rec. 525-26 (1972))).  
 Moreover, the standard of deliberate indifference, 
while accommodating the RA‟s and the ADA‟s function in 
protecting the disabled, is also consistent with contract 
principles at play when legislation is passed via the Spending 
Clause.  See Liese, 701 F.3d at 347.  The RA and the ADA 
were enacted under Congress‟s Spending Clause power; 
legislation that is enacted under this power “is much in the 
nature of a contract” between the federal government and 
recipients of federal funds.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  “Just as a valid contract 
requires offer and acceptance of its terms, „the legitimacy of 
Congress‟ power to legislate under the spending power rests 
on whether the recipient voluntarily and knowingly accepts 
the terms of the contract.‟”  Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).  
The Supreme Court has thus reasoned that a recipient of 
federal funding, such as the School District here, may be held 
liable for money damages only when it is on notice by statute 
that it has violated the law.  Id. (discussing monetary damages 
under Title VI); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 (discussing 
monetary damages under Title IX).   
 Because the deliberate indifference standard requires 
knowledge, this standard satisfies contract law principles 
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while still protecting the disabled.
24
  As the Eleventh Circuit 
explained,  
                                                 
24
 We note that our conclusion today — that deliberate 
indifference is the standard for the requisite showing of 
intentional discrimination in RA and ADA actions — is 
reconcilable with our previous decision in Pryor v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Relying on the Supreme Court‟s decision in Sandoval, Pryor 
held that plaintiffs challenging a policy of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) under Title VI 
could not satisfy the “intentional discrimination” requirement 
through evidence of disparate impact alone.  Pryor, 288 F.3d 
at 553 (addressing a challenge to a NCAA provision which 
raised the academic eligibility criteria for incoming student 
athletes that adversely affected black athletes); see also 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79 (addressing a challenge to a 
state policy that required all drivers‟ license examinations to 
be administered in English with no aids or accommodations 
for individuals who spoke English as a second language, and 
that adversely affected individuals of foreign national origin).  
In reaching this conclusion, Pryor specifically rejected 
deliberate indifference as a viable theory.  Pryor, 288 F.3d at 
568.  Pryor did so because it equated deliberate indifference 
with disparate impact.  Id. at 567.  In light of the Supreme 
Court‟s post-Sandoval jurisprudence, this was improper.  As 
this jurisprudence makes clear, deliberate indifference is a 
form of intentional discrimination, and not a pseudonym for 
disparate impact.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (recognizing that deliberate 
indifference is a form of intentional discrimination).  Despite 
this mislabeling of deliberate indifference, Pryor‟s holding 
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The deliberate indifference standard best 
reflects the purposes of § 504 while 
unambiguously providing the notice-and-
opportunity requirements of Spending Clause 
legislation. A lower standard would fail to 
provide the notice-and-opportunity 
                                                                                                             
that the mere fact of disparate impact is insufficient to sustain 
a Title VI challenge to a facially neutral policy remains good 
law.   
 Pryor is inapplicable to our situation here.  In cases 
involving action (or inaction) toward an individual that results 
in a violation of rights, such as we have here, the Supreme 
Court has readily accepted that deliberate indifference can 
create a viable cause of action.  See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-
91 (finding that the school district may be liable under the 
standard of deliberate indifference where a teacher sexually 
harassed a student); Davis v. Monroe Cnty., 526 U.S. 629, 
643 (1999) (same where a student sexually harassed another 
student); see also Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 
F.3d 685, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the 
Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence on deliberate indifference in 
the sexual harassment context is not easily transferrable to 
challenges to facially neutral policies).   
 Thus, to the extent that Pryor equated deliberate 
indifference with disparate impact, that holding cannot stand.  
To the extent that Pryor addressed the requisite showing of 
intentional discrimination for challenges to facially neutral 
policies with disparate impacts, we offer no comment. 
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requirements to RA defendants, while a higher 
standard—requiring discriminatory animus—
would run counter to congressional intent as it 
would inhibit § 504‟s ability to reach knowing 
discrimination in the absence of animus.  
Liese, 701 F.3d. at 348.  
C. Grant of Summary Judgment 
 
 We now turn to the merits of the appeal: whether there 
is evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a 
genuine factual dispute as to whether the School District was 
deliberately indifferent toward S.H. by mislabeling her as a 
disabled student.  To satisfy the deliberate indifference 
standard, Appellants must present evidence that shows both: 
(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially 
likely to be violated (i.e., knowledge that S.H. was likely not 
disabled and therefore should not have been in special 
education), and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.  See 
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.   
 Appellants argue that the School District had 
knowledge that S.H. had likely been misidentified for several 
reasons: (1) S.H. told her teachers in fifth grade and middle 
school that she did not think she belonged in special 
education; (2) S.H. protested her placement in special 
education in tenth grade by refusing to attend speech therapy; 
(3) within three months of S.H.‟s misidentification as a 
disabled student, S.H.‟s reading scores surpassed the fifth-
grade level; (4) S.H.‟s scores on standardized tests continued 
to show that S.H. tested at or around grade level; (5) S.H. 
continued to do well in school, making Honor Roll in seventh 
and eighth grade; and (6) the evaluations of three separate 
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psychologists, including Dr. Abdullah-Johnson, revealed that 
S.H. was not disabled.  We find these reasons unpersuasive to 
create a genuine factual dispute as to knowledge.   
 To begin, we are unpersuaded by Appellants‟ reliance 
on S.H.‟s testimony that she expressed unhappiness at being 
designated disabled in fifth grade (when she was ten years 
old) and later also told her seventh-grade teacher that she did 
not feel like she belonged in ISL classes.  S.H.‟s subjective 
complaints about being put in special education classes put 
the School District on notice of nothing more than the fact 
that S.H. did not like being in special education classes.  
More importantly, Ms. Durrell, despite S.H.‟s feelings, 
continued to approve her placement in special education.  
Where the parent agrees with, and gives informed consent to, 
a child‟s placement in special education, a child‟s feelings to 
the contrary can hardly constitute “notice.”  For similar 
reasons, we cannot say that S.H.‟s testimony that she told her 
IEP team that she hated going to speech therapy creates a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to the School District‟s 
knowledge.   
 Appellants‟ contention that the evaluations by the three 
psychologists put the School District on notice is also to no 
avail.  Dr. Abdullah-Johnson performed his evaluation in 
2010.  The other two evaluations, those of Dr. Jones and Dr. 
Rosenberg, were submitted in preparation for this lawsuit in 
2012, more than two years after S.H. had been removed from 
special education.
25
  These reports only evidence the School 
                                                 
25
 Dr. Jones conducted her evaluation of S.H. in December 
2011, and Dr. Rosenberg conducted his evaluation in January 
2012.   
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District‟s knowledge subsequent to their publication; nothing 
in the reports can be said to create a genuine dispute as to the 
School District‟s knowledge at the time it designated S.H. as 
having a learning disability (i.e. from 2004 through 2009).   
 Moreover, liability in this case is not dependent merely 
on whether the School District‟s psychologists erred in their 
determinations.  The relevant inquiry is knowledge, and 
evidence that the School District may have been wrong about 
S.H.‟s diagnosis is not evidence that the School District had 
knowledge that it was a wrong diagnosis.  Nor does evidence 
that the School District‟s evaluation processes were defective 
bear on our analysis.
26
  Additionally, we cannot say that the 
School District failed to act on this knowledge, as the School 
District immediately exited S.H. from special education 
                                                 
26
 Appellants allege that Ms. Cucinotta‟s and Dr. Cosden‟s 
evaluations were defective for using the predicted 
achievement method, failing to consider S.H.‟s familial 
circumstances and personal tragedies, and failing to consider 
all of S.H.‟s test scores.  However, evidence that the School 
District would have, or should have, known that S.H. was not 
disabled had the evaluations been free of defects, is 
insufficient.  Deliberate indifference requires actual 
knowledge; allegations that one would have or “should have 
known” will not satisfy the knowledge prong of deliberate 
indifference.  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 
2012) (holding that, under the deliberate indifference 
standard, “[i]t is not sufficient that the official should have 
known of the risk” (emphasis added)).  As such, we will not 
consider the allegedly defective evaluations as part of the 
knowledge analysis. 
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following Dr. Abdullah-Johnson‟s evaluation and upon Ms. 
Durrell‟s request.   
 Appellants‟ best argument as to knowledge is that 
S.H.‟s test scores and good grades in school should have put 
the School District on notice that she did not have a learning 
disability.  Ultimately, this evidence is insufficient as well.  
As an initial matter, S.H.‟s test scores, when taken as a whole, 
are not conclusive.  While S.H. performed well in some areas 
on various tests throughout her educational career, she 
performed below average in other areas.  For example, when 
S.H. was in seventh grade, S.H. scored at a 7.4 grade-level in 
vocabulary on the Stanford Diagnostic Reading Test, but 
scored at a 5.3 grade-level in comprehension and at a 4.1 
grade-level in “scanning.”  (App. 624.)  Similarly, in eighth 
grade, S.H. performed at the “advanced” level in reading and 
“proficient” level in writing on the PSSA, but performed 
“below basic” in both math and science.  (App. 625, 658.)  
Additionally, Appellants have offered no evidence that high 
test scores are an indication that a student likely does not have 
a learning disability, nor have they offered evidence that 
children in special education usually do not receive good 
grades.   
 Put simply, Appellants have presented no evidence 
that would create a genuine dispute as to whether the School 
District knew, prior to Dr. Abdullah-Johnson‟s evaluation, 
that S.H. had likely been misidentified as having a learning 
disability.  Thus, we need not explore the second prong of the 
 40 
 
deliberate indifference test, i.e., whether the School District 
failed to act.
27
 
                                                 
27
 Appellants also seem to suggest that the School District 
was on notice that it had likely misidentified S.H. because it 
was aware of the pervasive problem of over-identifying 
minority children as disabled in general.  In support of this 
argument, Appellants point to: (1) the IDEA‟s statutory 
warnings about over-identification; (2) a 2006 self-
assessment conducted by the School District that revealed 
that over-identification was occurring within the district; and 
(3) the deposition testimony from Assistant Superintendent 
Michael Kelly, who acknowledged awareness that a 
disproportionate number of African-American students were 
in special education compared to their representation in the 
student body.  This position is untenable. 
 While the “Findings” section of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400(c)(12)(A)-(E), does in fact suggest that over-
identification of minority children is a pressing concern, we 
fail to see the logic that this brief warning in a national law 
should put a local school district on notice of anything.  
Furthermore, as the 2006 self-assessment is not in the record 
before us, we may not consider it.  Even if we were to 
consider it, the evidence to be gleaned from the 2006 self-
assessment is far more limited than Appellants are willing to 
acknowledge.  The 2006 self-assessment did not put the 
School District on notice of over-identification specifically; at 
most, the 2006 self-assessment merely put the School District 
on notice that “there was a disproportionate number of 
African-American students in special education programs in 
Lower Merion.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. 
Supp. 2d 749, 757 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (discussing the contents of 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s orders.  
                                                                                                             
the 2006 self-assessment evaluation which noted that African-
Americans constituted 7.7% of the student body and 12.7% of 
the students in special education).  Thus, the 2006 self-
assessment evidences only that the School District knew that 
a disproportionate number of African-American students 
were enrolled in special education, a fact that Mr. Kelly 
testified to as well.  We cannot infer from this that the School 
District knew that S.H. in particular had been misidentified.  
Such an argument is too attenuated to stand. 
